Without international assistance, developing countries will adapt to climate change as best they can. Part of the cost will be absorbed by households and part by the public sector. Adaptation costs will themselves be affected by socioeconomic development, which will also be affected by climate change. Without a better understanding of these interactions, it will be difficult for climate negotiators and donor institutions to determine the appropriate levels and modes of adaptation assistance. This paper attempts to contribute by assessing the economics of adaptation to extreme weather events. We address several questions that are relevant for the international discussion: How will climate change alter the incidence of these events, and how will their impact be distributed geographically? How will future socioeconomic development affect the vulnerability of affected communities? And, of primary interest to negotiators and donors, how much would it cost to neutralize the threat of additional losses in this context?
From a narrow technical perspective, it might be desirable to address the latter question with a detailed engineering cost analysis of specific disaster prevention measures. However, as we show in the paper, existing cross-country information about relevant emergency preparedness programs is far too sparse to support systematic analysis and projection. And in any case, we believe that the effectiveness of such measures is contingent on the characteristics of the communities that employ them. We therefore adopt an alternative approach in this paper, focusing on the role of socioeconomic development in increasing climate resilience. Drawing on extensive research, our approach highlights the importance of female education and empowerment in reducing weather-related loss risks. Our cost analysis asks two key questions: As climate change increases potential vulnerability to extreme weather events, how many additional young women would have to be educated to neutralize this increased vulnerability? And how much would it cost?
Our study relies heavily on fixed-effects estimation of risk equations that link losses from floods and droughts during the period 1960-2003 to three basic determinants: weather events that increase potential losses, income per capita, and female education. We estimate separate equations for (a) the risk of death from a flood, (b) the risk of being affected by a flood, and (c) the risk of being affected by a drought (the data are too sparse to support estimation for death from droughts).
Our analysis combines the estimated risk equations with projections of economic growth, population growth, and changes in primary and secondary schooling. We develop three scenarios: (1) a baseline in which socioeconomic development continues but the climate does not change; and (2 and 3) two scenarios with the same baseline development path but alternative weather paths driven by particularly "wet" and "dry" GCMs (Global Climate Models). For each GCM scenario, we calculate the associated changes in the risks of death from floods and being affected by floods or droughts. Then, choosing the worst-case risk, we calculate the increase in female schooling that would neutralize this additional risk. We multiply the results by expenditures per student to estimate the total educational investment required to neutralize the additional weather risk posed by climate change.
Our approach is conservative, in the sense that it is very unlikely to underestimate the required investment. First, we base our cost assessment on general preparedness via increased education, rather than more narrowly targeted investment in emergency preparedness.
executive summarY
Second, we base our cost calculation on worst-case risk scenarios, which require the greatest increase in schooling to neutralize. Third, we incorporate only projected increases in vulnerability, not decreases. As an alternative, for example, we could perform a net impact analysis for a wet-climate scenario that would subtract expected decreased losses from drought from expected increased losses from flooding. Fourth, our analysis employs the two GCMs (among approximately twenty) that generate the wettest and driest scenarios at the global scale. Other GCMs would generate more moderate intermediate results. Finally, we do not average across the two GCMs, which would have the effect of neutralizing their extreme signals.
In summary, we believe that our approach is sufficiently conservative to create a strong upward bias in our cost estimation. It is certainly possible that the "true" cost of adaptation to extreme weather events is lower than our estimates, but we doubt that it is higher.
At the same time, our approach offers significant co-benefits because female education has a much broader sphere of potential influence than direct investment in emergency preparedness. As the development literature has noted for many years, educating young women is one of the major determinants (indeed, some would argue, the major determinant) of sustainable development. A disaster-prevention approach that focuses on investment in female education therefore has an expected social rate of return on other margins that probably warrants the exercise, even if the expected benefits in reduced disaster vulnerability are overstated (and in fact, we believe the opposite to be true).
Our analysis has generated a set of estimates for required female schooling and associated costs by GCM scenario, country and year. Variations in projected climatic, socioeconomic and demographic variables are more than sufficient to produce wide disparities in outcomes by 2050, even among countries within the same region. At the country and regional levels, neither climate scenario dominates in all cases. The "wet" scenario generates higher risk-neutralizing expenditure on female schooling in somecountries and regions; the "dry" scenario is more costly in others. Among regions, South Asia requires the most expenditure in both climate scenarios, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia, and then more distantly by the other regions.
At both regional and global levels, we find an impressive scale for the requisite increases in female education expenditure. By mid-century, neutralizing the impact of extreme weather events requires educating an additional 18 to 23 million young women at a cost of $11 to $14 billion annually. For the period 2000-50 as a whole, both GCM scenarios entail about $280 billion in additional expenditure. The present value of these expenditures is substantially reduced by time-discounting, even at modest rates, but the basic result stands: In the developing world, neutralizing the impact of worsening weather over the coming decades will require educating a large new cohort of young women at a cost that will steadily escalate to several billions of dollars annually. However, it will be enormously worthwhile on other margins to invest in education for millions of young women who might otherwise be denied its many benefits.
IntroductIon
Without international assistance, developing countries will adapt to climate change as best they can. Part of the cost will be absorbed by households and part by the public sector. Adaptation costs will themselves be affected by socioeconomic development, which will also be affected by climate change. Without a better understanding of these interactions, it will be difficult for climate negotiators and donor institutions to determine the appropriate levels and modes of adaptation assistance. This paper attempts to assess the economics of adaptation to extreme weather events. We address several questions that are relevant for the international discussion: How will climate change alter the incidence of these events, and how will their impact be distributed geographically? How will future socioeconomic development affect the vulnerability of affected communities? And, of primary interest to negotiators and donors, how much would it cost to neutralize the threat of additional losses in this context?
From a narrow technical perspective, it might be desirable to address the latter question with a detailed engineering cost analysis of specific disaster prevention measures. However, as we show in the paper, existing cross-country information about relevant emergency preparedness programs is far too sparse to support systematic analysis and projection. And in any case, we believe that the effectiveness of such measures is contingent on the characteristics of the communities that employ them. We therefore adopt an alternative approach in this paper, focusing on the role of socioeconomic development in increasing climate resilience.
Our analysis builds on empirical work and case studies that have documented the role of socioeconomic development in reducing vulnerability to climate shocks. Horwich (2000) , Tol and Leek (1999) , Burton et al. (1993) , and Kahn (2005) have focused on the effect of rising income per capita: As communities get richer, they have greater willingness and ability to pay for preventive measures. Kahn (2005) finds that the institutional improvement that accompanies economic development also plays a significant role through enhanced public-sector capability to organize disaster prevention and relief.
Other work focuses on the role of political and human development. Albala-Bertrand (1993) AlbalaBertrand (1993), and Toya and Skidmore (2005) is that empowering women through improved education may be a critical factor in reducing families' vulnerability to weather-related disasters. This would also be consistent with the extensive literature that documents the powerful effect of female education on community-level social capital and general welfare measures such as life expectancy (King and Mason 2001) .
To the best of our knowledge, no empirical research has focused on female education as a potentially critical determinant of vulnerability to extreme weather events. Assessing its importance and implications is a core feature of this paper. Drawing on an econometric analysis of panel data, we address two key questions: As climate change increases potential vulnerability to extreme weather events, can expanding female education neutralize this increased vulnerability? If so, how much would it cost?
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of losses from extreme weather events in developing countries during the period 1960-2006. In Section 3, we review recent projections of climate impacts, economic growth, and demographic change. We focus particularly on projections by integrated assessment models that incorporate links between climate change and economic activity. Section 4 specifies a set of risk equations for weatherrelated disasters and estimates them by fixed effects. In Section 5, we develop country-specific projections for female education. Section 6 uses our econometric results and education projections to forecast future risks under alternative assumptions about climate change. In Section 7, we use these projections to estimate the cost of reducing future weather-related risks through more intensive investment in female education. Section 8 summarizes and concludes the paper.
Losses from extreme Weather sInce 1960
The most comprehensive data on weather-related losses are maintained by the Centre (Figure 2 ). Nevertheless, as Table 1 and Figure  2 show, the number of people affected by droughts continues to be huge.
What LIes ahead
Our approach to impact forecasting incorporates projected socioeconomic and demographic trends as well as climate change. This requires us to adopt internally consistent assumptions about future changes in emissions, economies, human development levels, and populations. The emissions scenario leads to a forecast of greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere, which is related to changes in global and local climate through one of a large number of global circulation models (GCMs). For the economic forecast, we draw on a recent summary of integrated assessment models by Hughes (2009) , who draws on a critical assessment of the IPCC's SRES scenarios by We attempt to bound the set of reasonable expectations about future climate using GCMs with strongly contrasting predictions. Within the SRES A2 scenario, the GCMs provide a relatively uniform view of future increases in temperature. However, this is not the case for precipitation, which-as we will show in the following section-is closely related to losses from floods and droughts. To provide a sense of what is possible from the current scientific perspective, our projections use two GCMs that are the wettest and driest of approximately 20 available GCMs at the global level. The driest overall is CSIRO's Mk 3.0 model, which was transmitted to the IPCC's data collection center in 2005. 4 The driest is NCAR's Community Climate System Model (CCSM), version 3.0, which was released to the public in 2004. 5 To illustrate the implications of the forecasts, Figure 3 provides historical and projected data for India for income per capita, population, life expectancy, fertility, mean annual rainfall, and maximum (monthly) annual temperature. We include both the CSIRO and NCAR weather projections. It is immediately clear that the India of 2050 bears little resemblance to present-day India, even in our relatively moderate scenario. This illustration serves to make one point very clearly: In scenario A2, the GCMs concur that India's temperature will rise steadily as greenhouse gases accumulate in the atmosphere. They also predict significant impacts on precipitation, but not consistently, and with different implications for extreme events. A wetter India will experience more floods, while a drier India will have more droughts. But in either case, it is critical to note that a changed climate in the full scenario is associated with a changed country. By 2050, India has become a middle-income country, whose per capita income, human resources, and institutional capabilities give it much greater resilience in the face of weather changes.
The Indian case reflects a more general and underappreciated feature of scenario A2, as well as the other SRES scenarios: Anticipated future emissions increases reflect the expectation that development will also continue. By implication, many of the countries currently termed low income or lower middle income by the World Bank will have departed that status by 2050.
Tables 3a and 3b, calculated from the Hughes' (2009) projections, provide striking evidence of this shift for 94 countries identified as low income and lower middle income by the World Bank in 2000. Table 3a tracks the status of 56 low-income countries through the succeeding decades. By 2050, 27 have moved to lower-middleincome status or higher. In summary, even our moderately optimistic projections entail very large changes for developing countries during the next four decades. And, more importantly for this analysis, these changes are directly tied to the emissions scenario that generates the climate change problem. Countries with much higher incomes and life expectancies will also have much greater willingness and ability to pay for protection from extreme weather events. They will also have more highly educated populations with much greater ability to avoid losses from adverse weather. This turns out to have major consequences for our assessment of future risk, as we will see in the next section.
deveLopment and vuLnerabILItY to extreme Weather events
As we noted in Section 2, extreme floods have killed over 170,000 people since 1960; droughts have killed millions; and billions of people have been seriously affected by extreme weather events. A changing climate may carry even greater risks in the future. But, as we noted above, changing development levels will also affect resilience in the face of weather shocks. To determine the balance between worsening weather and growing resilience over time, we specify a model of weather-related impact risk and estimate it using panel data for the period 1960-2002. Panel estimation allows for relatively clear interpretation of results, because it absorbs many sources of potentially misleading crosssectional correlation into estimated country effects. At the same time, however, the need for lengthy time series limits the estimation variables to a sparse set.
Our specification of the risk model incorporates three effects: economic development, weather, and education.
We focus on female education, for reasons that we explained in the introduction. The formal specification is as follows for country i in period t:
(1)
where R = Impact risk (death from floods; affected by floods and droughts) L = Total loss (persons killed or affected) P = Population G = GDP per capita E = Female educational enrollment rate R = Precipitation T = Temperature ε = A random error term Event-related losses are drawn from the CRED database; data on population, GDP per capita (in constant $US 2000) and education are drawn from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. We use constant-dollar GDP data to maximize the sample size for years prior to 1980. Data on net female primary and secondary enrollment rates are limited to the period since 1990. To extend the series for panel estimation, we "backcast" them using panel regressions that relate enrollment ratios to income per capita, life expectancy, and the total fertility rate (see Section 5). These associational regressions are a transformation of the conventional fertility equation, in which the total fertility rate is a function of income per capita, life expectancy, and female schooling.
We specify the education rates as flogs, to ensure that predictions are restricted to the interval 0-100 percent.
For a probability p between 0 and 1, the flog is defined as log [p/(1-p)]. This is an appropriate specification for the regressions in any case, since it is consistent with natural lower and upper bounds for net enrollment rates. These are, in effect, first-stage regressions, with the total fertility rate, life expectancy, and per capita income playing the role of instruments for second-stage estimation of the climate impact regressions. Life expectancy is not significantly affected by deaths from floods, which are minuscule by comparison with deaths from other causes. Therefore, use of this variable as a first-stage instrument should not lead to biased estimates for schooling in the regression for death from floods. Table 5 presents the fixed-effects estimation results, which are extremely robust in both regressions for the total fertility rate and life expectancy. Per capita income is not a significant determinant of net female primary enrollment, but it has great explanatory power in the secondary enrollment regression.
Prior experimentation has indicated that the appropriate functional form for equation (1) is log-linear, and that some climate indicators are much more robust than others. In every case, mean rainfall is far more robust than either maximum or minimum rainfall, as well as other possible transformations (max/min ratio, etc.). No measure of temperature (mean, maximum, minimum, max/min ratio, etc.) is significant in any of the three risk equations. Table 6 presents results for the risk of being killed or affected by floods and affected by droughts. Footnote 1 provides a detailed explanation of the criteria for determining persons affected. Our instrumental variables approach creates high collinearity for primary and secondary enrollment ratios, so we estimate separate equations for primary and secondary schooling. This serves our primary objective-inferring the schooling needed to neutralize future climate impacts-but raises the risk of upward bias in the separately estimated impact of each schooling variable. Such bias would lead to an ultimate underestimate of schooling required to neutralize climate change (the higher the estimated effect of schooling on risk, the lower the schooling needed to neutralize additional risk from worsening weather). However, we compensate for this by using the two sets of econometric results to calculate demands for primary and secondary education separately. This introduces something akin to double-counting, thereby reducing or eliminating the effect of upward bias in the regressions themselves.
The panel estimation results in Table 6 are quite robust for flooding risk, with all variables highly significant and all parameter signs consistent with prior expectations. Flood risk rises significantly as mean precipitation rises and falls significantly as per capita income rises. The two schooling variables have highly significant impacts of approximately equal magnitude: Flood risk falls as female enrollment increases. The results are much weaker for drought risk, partly because the smaller sample size reduces degrees of freedom for estimation. GDP per capita is insignificant and has a perverse sign when it is included in these regressions, so we have excluded it from the estimates. Education and rainfall retain the correct signs, although only female primary enrollment is significant at 5 percent. These are the maximum likelihood estimates in any case, and we need to project drought effects, so we retain the two drought equations in Table 6 .
To explore the implications of our results, we compare actual historical losses with a counterfactual case in
Note: absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. which countries at each World Bank development level are assigned the same female primary enrollment ratio as the "best practice" country in the same World Bank class in the same year (e.g., all low-income countries in 1985 are assigned the highest female primary enrollment ratio among low-income countries in 1985). We perform this experiment to see how much difference feasible policy changes could have made for extreme weather risk. As Table 7 and Figure 4 show, our results strongly indicate that more progressive policies would have made an enormous difference. From 1970 to 1999, the CRED database records 153,079 deaths from floods in low-income and lowermiddle-income countries. In our "best practice" counterfactual, by contrast, flood deaths number 91,541: 61,538 fewer people lose their lives. For numbers affected, the estimated differences are very large. From 1960 to 1999, the CRED database indicates that 2.12 billion people in developing countries were affected by floods. In the counterfactual best practice case, this falls by 465 million to 1.65 billion. For droughts, the number affected falls by about 667 million-from 1.34 billion to 676 million.
We conclude that a huge number of weather-related tragedies could have been averted if more developing countries had focused on progressive but feasible female education policies. Countries that focused on female education suffered far fewer losses from extreme weather events than less-progressive countries with equivalent income and weather conditions. It seems reasonable to assert that what has been true in the past will also be true in the future. Given the significance of income and female education in determining vulnerability to extreme weather events, we would expect countries' future resilience to increase with economic growth and improvements in education.
projectIng baseLIne changes In femaLe educatIon
The panel estimation results in Table 5 provide a reasonable basis for projecting the future paths of female primary and secondary education in each country, given our exogenous projections of income and population. Our projections for life expectancy and the total fertility rate are taken directly from the UN's medium-variant population forecast. Given the paths of the three variables (life expectancy, total fertility rate, income per capita), we use the fixed-effects results reported in Table 5 to plot the paths of future net female primary and secondary enrollment rates. Here it is worth repeating that we estimate both equations in Table 5 using flog transformations on net enrollment rates, which insure that projections are bounded in the range 0-100.
To illustrate the implications of our approach, Table 8 presents projected future schooling rates by region. We compute these rates in several steps. First, we estimate the panel regressions, incorporating subregional dummies as well as country effects. 6 Then we combine 6 We include fixed effects for 25 subregions.
the results with country projections of GDP per capita, life expectancy, and the total fertility rate to predict future net female primary and secondary enrollment rates. We combine these rates with appropriate UN medium-variant female population cohort data to calculate the actual number of females enrolled in primary and secondary school. Finally, we total enrolled females and relevant cohort females by region for primary and secondary schooling, and form the ratios to project regional primary and secondary enrollment ratios.
Although our economic and demographic projections are "moderate" by current standards, they nevertheless entail continued rapid progress in female education. By 2050, Sub-Saharan Africa increases its net female primary enrollment rate from 54.9 to 93.5, and its net female secondary enrollment rate from 19.7 to 78.0. South Asia also makes rapid progress, moving its female primary and secondary enrollment rates from 69.5 to 92.4 and 42.0 to 90.8, respectively. East Asia/Pacific, Latin American/Caribbean, and Middle East/North Africa also move upward, but proportionately less because they start from higher bases. While educational progress is quite noteworthy in this scenario, it still falls well short of the Millennium Development Goals. For example, Sub-Saharan Africa only approaches the MDG for female primary education by 2050. Now we turn our attention to simulating the future. Our approach is identical to the counterfactual approach in Section 4, except that all of the right-hand variables are projected for this exercise. To get a clear sense of the stakes, we introduce several variants: We estimate impacts with and without climate change, for both GCM climate projections, and with and without improvements in income and female education. We introduce the latter variant to highlight the stark difference in results when only future emissions are counted, not the economic and human development that accompany those emissions. As we have noted in Section 3, forty years hence many of today's low-and lowermiddle-income countries will have experienced major growth in income and female education. Our panel results in Table 6 suggest that the latter changes will fIgure 5. Loss rIsks In IndIa, 2000-50 have a significant impact on climate vulnerability. To assess the relevant magnitudes, we develop a detailed illustration for India that incorporates variations in the GCMs and development conditions.
We focus on computed risks, or incidence probabilities, because they provide clear insight into the impact of model variables on projected future losses. In each case, the relevant probability is multiplied by population to provide an overall loss estimate. India's population is projected to continue growing to about 1.66 billion people by 2050. Since the population is growing, even constant risk (measured as a loss probability) will translate to more losses when it is multiplied by the growing population.
In Figure 5 , our historical baseline for India is set at income per capita and life expectancy in 2000, and mean precipitation during the period 1995-2000. The associated annual loss probabilities are .62 per million Thus, holding economic and social development constant at 2000 levels, precipitation variations across GCMs include a range of about .09 per million in flood death risk. In all cases, the deviation from current death risk is sufficiently small to be dominated by population growth in the assessment of losses. Table 9 presents the relevant projections. In the "Historical" case, projected annual deaths increase from 626 to 1,023 (the risk of death remains constant, while population continues growing). Projected annual deaths from flooding rise to 1,092 for NCAR, the wettest scenario, and fall to 950 for CSIRO, the driest. Clearly, the differences are quite small in absolute terms: By 2050, climate is responsible for 69 additional flood-related deaths per year in the NCAR scenario, and 73 fewer deaths in CSIRO. For the entire fifty-year period, continuation of the historical climate pattern in a static India (at 2000 income per capita and educational enrollment rates) would yield 44,038 expected deaths from flooding. In the static case, this rises to 45,458 for the NCAR climate change scenario and falls to 41,325 for CSIRO.
In comparison to these relatively small mortality effects, the number of people affected by floods is larger by one order of magnitude and people affected by droughts by two orders of magnitude. For floods, the baseline probability of being affected (in the static-India case with no climate change) is .0039. This rises to .0043 for NCAR climate change and falls to .0035 for CSIRO. These are much larger fractions than the death risks, and they translate to large absolute numbers. Projected people affected annually rises from 4.0 million to 6.5 million in the baseline case (constant risk, population growth), rises to 7.2 million for NCAR (in a static India), and falls to 5.7 million for CSIRO. Thus, the range of impacts is between 700,000 more people and 800,000 fewer people affected by floods. The associated totals and differences in Table 9 are quite large: A fifty-year increase from the baseline of 15 million for NCAR (293.6 vs. 278.6 million), and a decrease of 27.7 million for NCAR. The numbers are larger by another order of magnitude for drought, but in the opposite direction. For annual numbers affected by drought, the baseline case rises from 51.6 million in 2000 to 84.4 million in 2050. The numbers rise less rapidly in the NCAR (wet) case for a static India, to 77.1 million and more rapidly for CSIRO (dry), to 93.4 million. Translated to fifty-year totals, the differences are huge: 337 million Of course, all of the projections above are unrealistic, because they assume a static India that bears no resemblance to the India in the climate change forecasts. As we have seen in a previous section, that India is quite close to present-day Chile in income and education levels by 2050. Despite their unreality, we have included the static-India forecasts because we believe that they reflect the implicit assumptions in many current climate-impact analyses.
For an instructive contrast, we now turn to projections that also utilize the fixed-effects estimates for equation (1), but incorporate our income and education projections for India. Although we will review the numbers in some detail, the basic results are made graphically clear by the "Development" scenarios in Figure 5 . For flooding, in both NCAR and CSIRO scenarios, the probabilities of being killed or affected plunge so sharply that they dominate rising population in the calculation of total losses. The result is many fewer deaths and people affected by floods in 2050, although there is still a climate affect at a much lower level. A rapid fall is also evident for risk in the NCAR scenario for drought, although much less so for CSIRO.
When we translate these risks into total losses, the results are quite striking. The India of 2050 has annual flooding deaths of about 461 for NCAR and CSIRO, vs. 1,023 in the baseline. It has 3.6 million people affected by floods in NCAR and 2.8 million in CSIRO, vs. 6.5 million in the baseline. In the case of droughts, 62.5 million are affected in NCAR and 75.7 million in CSIRO, vs. 84.4 million in the baseline.
We draw two conclusions from these results. First, it still makes sense to discuss financial support for adaptation to climate change in this context, because risks and losses can still be greater with climate change than without it. But second, and perhaps more important, our results strongly indicate that the India of 2050 will suffer fewer losses from extreme weather after four more decades of climate change than present-day India suffers.
For global perspective, we have included the same projection comparisons for all developing countries in with climate change than without it (the impact depends on whether the wet or dry scenario dominates), but the available evidence makes it very likely that it will suffer far fewer losses than presently in either case. And our results for female education in equation (1) reinforce a fundamental point: If we are really interested in reducing losses from climate events, assistance for greater resiliency now can make a huge difference.
7. estImatIng the cost of adaptIng to extreme Weather events
data on Weather emergencY preparedness costs
Systematic work on the cost of adaptation to extreme weather events has been hindered by scanty data on the cost of measures for emergency preparedness. A study of this type would be aided considerably by countryspecific cost information for measures targeted on floods or droughts. However, the representative information in Table 11 illustrates why we have not been able to employ such information. Its entries have been extracted from country reports by the Asian Disaster Reduction Center. The reports generally focus on summary information rather than specific information for emergency preparedness by type of disaster (e.g., floods, droughts). In the case of Japan, for example, much of the $34 billion expenditure is clearly for earthquake-related measures. The listed funds for Bangladesh are more than twice China's and four times Indonesia's, and they include both emergency food assistance and disaster management. Much of the Indonesian fund undoubtedly relates to geologic disasters (earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis), as well as weather-related disasters.
Most reports do not provide time series information, nor do they go beyond reporting for single funds or In summary, the available data are far too spotty, nonspecific, non-standardized, and temporally limited to permit estimation of cost functions that could be used for projection. In addition, they cover relatively few countries. There is simply no way to construct a reasonable cost analysis from such information.
the education alternative
Since direct cost measures cannot be derived from the available data, we turn to an indirect approach. As the panel results in Table 6 show, improvements in female education are powerfully associated with reductions in disaster risks once changes in weather and income are accounted for. In this section, we exploit this relationship to address the adaptation cost question indirectly.
Our approach applies straightforward algebra to equation (1). Given an anticipated change in precipitation, we calculate the increase in education that will be just sufficient to restore the risk level prior to the precipitation change. With subscripts B for the baseline case and N for the risk-neutralizing case, we impose the following constraint on the relevant elements of equation (1) (the others cancel because they remain unchanged):
This yields the change in the educational enrollment rate that will neutralize the change in risk introduced by deviation of rainfall from the baseline case:
For each education level, we calculate ΔE i for persons killed by floods, persons affected by floods, and persons affected by droughts. Adopting a conservative approach, we only consider positive ΔE i . 8 We compute 7 Our thanks to Tim Essam for his help in gathering this information.
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In a wetter climate regime, the number of people killed and affected by floods will rise, but the number affected by droughts will fall. The converse is true for a dryer regime. A complete accounting would therefore involve calculation of net impacts (losses from flooding vs.
the 50-year sum of positive ΔE i for each of the three risks and, in keeping with our conservative approach, we choose the risk for which the sum is largest.
the cost oF climate change neutralization
Now we are ready to compute the cost of neutralizing the risk impact of more extreme weather events via increased schooling for young women. Once we have chosen the appropriate ΔE i for each schooling level in each country, computing the associated incremental cost involves two steps. First, we obtain the number of new students by multiplying ΔE i (as a percent) by the number of females in the appropriate age cohort. 9 Then we multiply by projected expenditure per pupil.
To compute projected unit expenditures, we have drawn on the World Bank's World Development Indicators to estimate panel regressions for primary and secondary expenditures per student as a proportion of GDP per capita. After extensive experimentation with available and plausible right-hand variables (e.g., per capita income, size of student population, time trend), we find significance only for country, subregional, and regional fixed effects. We use all three sets of fixed effects to get the most accurate estimates for countries that have no unit expenditure data in the WDI. Then we apply the country estimates to projected per capita income to obtain predicted expenditures per primary and secondary student by year. We combine these with the calculated numbers of primary and secondary students required for "climate change neutralization" to obtain our estimate of the public cost. Table 12 provides a representative set of results for three countries: Republic of Congo, Nepal, and Nicaragua. For ease of interpretation, we present results at ten-year intervals, beginning in 2010. The results highlight the global diversity that interacts with the GCM losses from droughts) But in the case of floods, such an exercise would require assigning relative weights to being killed and being affected (injured, rendered homeless, or requiring temporary assistance). It would also require the assignment of relative weights to the affects of floods and droughts. Rather than adopt arbitrary weights, we take the conservative approach and use the greatest change in enrollment ratio across the three risk categories.
9
Our primary-school cohort is young women in age group 5-9, plus half of young women 10-14. Our secondary cohort is half the age group 10-14, plus the age group 15-19. projections. Overall costs are higher for CSIRO in Congo and Nepal, and for NCAR in Nicaragua; we focus on the higher-cost scenario for each country.
Here it is useful to recall that these are adjustments from a baseline in which the countries continue their socioeconomic development. Weather-impact risks decline as income and life expectancy increase. The numbers in Table 12 reflect the deviations from this baseline, which assumes no climate change.
In Congo, neutralizing the effect of climate change in the CSIRO scenario requires 4,700. additional females in primary school in 2010, along with 4,100 additional female students in secondary school. The associated annual schooling costs for primary and secondary students are $97 and $233, respectively. When these are applied to the schooling increments, the result is an additional expenditure of $1.4 million in 2010. The numbers increase steadily through 2040. In that year, the addition to schooling is 32,900 primary students and 32,400 secondary students which, at projected unit costs of $218 and $524, yields a total expenditure of $24.2 million. Projected short-term moderation of climate impact after 2040 reduces the numbers in 2050.
In Nepal, the number of needed additional students in the CSIRO (higher-cost) scenario is far greater than for the Congo and the unit costs substantially lower. When combined, the two factors yield climate-neutralizing costs that increase from $5.9 million in 2010 to $27.2 million in 2040, then fall to $26.5 million in 2050. The NCAR scenario is more potentially damaging for Nicaragua than CSIRO. Neutralizing the impact of NCAR-projected change requires the addition of 35,900 young women to primary schooling and 69,400 to secondary schooling in 2010. The total cost is $5.9 million in 2010, increasing to $13.5 million in 2050. 10
10 Like many countries in Latin America, Nicaragua is reported by the World Development Indicators as spending more per capita on primary students than on secondary students. The results for Nicaragua in Table 12 reflect this disparity. 
summarY and concLusIons
In this paper, we have addressed several questions that are relevant for the international discussion of adaptation to climate change: How will climate change alter the incidence of these events, and how will their impact be distributed geographically? How will future socioeconomic development affect the vulnerability of affected communities? And, of primary interest to negotiators and donors, how much would it cost to neutralize the threat of additional losses in this context?
Our study relies heavily on fixed-effects estimation of risk equations that link losses from floods and droughts during the period 1960-2003 to three basic determinants: weather events that increase potential losses, income per capita, and female education. We estimate separate equations for the risk of death from a flood, the risk of being affected by a flood, and the risk of being affected by a drought (the data are too sparse to support estimation for death from droughts).
Our analysis combines the estimated risk equations with projections of economic growth and population change, along with accompanying changes in primary and secondary schooling. We develop three scenarios: A baseline in which socioeconomic development continues but the climate does not change, and two scenarios with the same baseline development path but alternative weather paths driven by particularly "wet" and "dry" GCMs. For each GCM scenario, we calculate the associated changes in the risks of death from floods and being affected by floods or droughts. Then, choosing the worst-case risk, we calculate the increase in female schooling that would neutralize this additional risk. We multiply the results by expenditures per student to estimate the total educational investment required to neutralize the additional weather risk posed by climate change.
Our approach is conservative, in the sense that it is very unlikely to underestimate the required investment. First, we base our cost assessment on general preparedness via increased education, rather than more narrowly targeted investment in emergency preparedness. Second, we base our cost calculation on worst-case risk scenarios, which require the greatest increase in schooling to neutralize. Third, we incorporate only projected increases in vulnerability, not decreases. As an alternative, for example, we could perform a net impact analysis for a wet climate scenario that would subtract expected decreased losses from drought from expected increased losses from flooding. Fourth, our analysis employs the two GCMs (among approximately twenty) that generate the wettest and driest scenarios at the global scale. Other GCMs would generate more moderate intermediate results. Finally, we do not average across the two GCMs, which would have the effect of neutralizing their extreme signals.
In summary, we believe that our approach is sufficiently conservative to create a strong upward bias in our cost estimation. It is certainly possible that the "true" cost of adaptation to extreme weather events is lower than our estimates, but we very much doubt that it is higher.
Our analysis has generated a set of estimates for required female schooling and associated costs by GCM scenario, country, and year. Variations in projected climatic, socioeconomic, and demographic variables are more than sufficient to produce wide disparities in outcomes by 2050, even among countries within the same region. At the country and regional levels, neither climate scenario dominates in all cases. The "wet" scenario generates higher risk-neutralizing expenditure on female schooling in some countries and regions; the "dry" scenario is more costly in others. Among regions, South Asia requires the most expenditure in both climate scenarios, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia, and then more distantly by the other regions.
At both regional and global levels, we find an impressive scale for the requisite increases in female education expenditure. By mid-century, neutralizing the impact of extreme weather events requires educating an additional 18 to 23 million young women at a cost of $11 to $14 billion annually. For the period 2000-50 as a whole, both GCM scenarios entail about $280 billion in additional expenditure. The present value of these expenditures is substantially reduced by time-discounting, even at modest rates, but the basic result stands: In the developing world, neutralizing the impact of worsening weather over the coming decades will require educating a large new cohort of young women at a cost that will steadily escalate to several billions of dollars annually. However, it will be enormously worthwhile on other margins to invest in education for millions of young women, who might otherwise be denied its many benefits.
